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 ABSTRACT.  This treatise begins with a discussion of different clauses of the Bill 
of Rights in the South African Constitution and the land reform policies of the 
South African government.  The inequality and injustice caused by decades of 
apartheid land law forms the background of the land reform programme.  The 
treatise addresses the consequences of this legacy on the implementation of the 
South African Constitution including the right to property.  The discussion includes 
the three key elements of the land reform programme namely restitution, 
redistribution and tenure reform. 
The content of this treatise ranges over these three elements of land reform, 
applying constitutional issues to the relevant case law, The balancing and the 
reconciliation of rights and interest between the individual and the public in a just 
manner will be the barometer. 
The conclusion shows that the Constitution both protects existing rights and 
authorises the promotion of land reform within the framework of Section 25 of the 
Constitution, and that every aspect of the property clause has to be regarded as 
part of a constitional effort in balancing individual interest and public interest in 
terms of a constitutional order. 
 
It is my sincere hope that this treatise will contribute toward the achievement of 
equity, stability and by the values of an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, freedom and human rights. 
 
Key words:  Deprivation, expropriation, human rights to property, land restitution, 
land redistribution, security of tenure, Bill of Rights South African Constitution. 
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 G L O S S A R Y  
 
Absolution from the instance : Dismissing the case. 
 
Appeal Upheld   : Appeal successful. 
 
Arbitrary    : Based on personal opinion or impulse, not any reason or  
  system. 
 
Bill of Rights    : A statement of the basic rights of the citizens of a country. 
 
Compensation   : The action of compensating. 
 
Constitution    : A system of laws and principles according to which a state   
                                                        or other organisation is governed. 
 
Deprivation    : The action or process of depriving or of being deprived of. 
 
Equality    : The principle that human beings are of identical worth or are  
 entitled to be treated in the same way: equality can have  
 widely differing applications. 
 
Evict     : To remove from a house or land with the support of the law. 
 
Expropriation : To take away property from its owner for public use without      
                                                        payment.  
 
Frivolous vexatious : Meaningless 
 
Government : The machinery through which collective decisions are made   
  on behalf of the state, usually comprising legislature,  
  executive and judiciary. 
 
Human Rights : Rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human;   
     universal and fundamental rights. 
 
Jurisdiction : The official power to make legal decisions and judgements   
 about a matter. 
 
Justice    : A moral standard of fairness and impartiality, social justice is  
 the notion of a fair or justifiable distribution of wealth and  
 rewards in society. 
 
Law     : Established and public rules of social conduct, backed by  
 the machinery of the state: the police, courts and prisons. 
 
Plaintiff : A person who brings a legal action to court (in a court of 
law). 
 
Property    : A thing or things owned; a possession or possessions. 
 
Redistribution   : The redistribution of wealth or land. 
 
 iv
 Restitution : The action of giving what was lost or stolen back to its 
original  owner.  
 
State     : An association that establishes sovereign power within a  
 defined territorial area, usually processing a monopoly of  
 coercive power. 
 
Usufruct    : Life usufruct. 
 
Vacate    : To leave a place or position. 
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 LATIN ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Ad infinitum    : Without limit 
 
A quo     : From which 
 
De novo    : Anew from the beginning 
 
In casu    : In the case in question 
 
In limine    : Initially 
 
Ipso facto    : By the very fact 
 
Juris prudence   : General Law 
 
Locus standi    : A right of appearance in court 
 
Mandament van spolie  : Spoliation order 
 
Maxim ubi ius ubi remediom : Where there is a right there is a remedy 
 
Prima facie    : At first sight 
 
Res judicata    : Case already decided 
 
Sine die    : For a further meeting or hearing 
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  CHAPTER ONE 
 
BILL OF RIGHTS AND LAND REFORM POLICIES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This treatise focuses on land rights and their protection in a Bill of Rights. The challenge  
exists in the balance between theory and practice.  A truly meaningful discussion and 
evaluation of human rights to land in a society in transformation should follow not only a 
legal discourse, but also reflect on the way in which this discourse is manifested in 
practice in the society.  In this paper it is taken for granted that we are involved in a 
fundamental restructuring of society and the legal order of land and human rights.  The 
question revolves around the rights of those dispossessed from their property by apartheid 
laws, and also the rights of current owners whose land has been identified for redress. 
 
It can safely be said that the purpose of the constitutional property guarantee should be to 
find and maintain a balance between individual interests and the public interest.  This 
means that the constitutional property clause cannot be interpreted or applied from an 
exclusively private-law or an exclusively public-law perspective. Instead, a just and 
equitable balance has to be established between the two alternatives. 
 
In this treatise, the way in which the balance between these two groups of rights is dealt 
with in South Africa’s land reform process is examined through a review of particular 
cases to come before the court in order to achieve a fair and just settlement between the 
individual interest and the public interest.  
  
 
1.1 Context of research 
 
 A constitution is a document that contains the most important laws that regulate state and 
government functions.  Private law is usually said to be concerned with the relation 
between individuals, and not with state functions.  It is also, however, recognised that 
private and public spheres cannot be separated so easily.  This fact was demonstrated in 
the old South African laws of apartheid, where government policy had enormous 
implications on private law and human rights.  The De Klerk government’s introduction of 
a range of land reforms in response to increased pressure for political and social 
transformation should therefore not be surprising.  The reforms proposed by the De Klerk 
government were introduced by way of a White Paper on land reform in March 1991, 
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 followed by a series of legislative measures,1 that abolished racially-based land laws2 
provided for restitution of land dispossessed under apartheid, upgraded the security of 
tenure of black land holders,3 and facilitated the establishment of black townships in 
former white areas to ease the burden of urban homelessness.4
 
 The direction of land reform was characterised by three main elements: 
 
 The restitution of land rights that had been dispossessed in terms of apartheid laws and 
practices; 
 Improvement of security of tenure for those whose land rights were weakened by 
apartheid land laws; 
 The introduction of measures to increase and facilitate access to land and housing for 
individuals and communities who have been deprived of these during apartheid.5 
 
The 1993 Constitution explicitly provided for land reform, and attempted to establish a 
balance between the promotion of land reform and the protection of existing property and 
human rights.  In the 1996 Constitution, the land reform provisions in Section 25 again 
reflected the distinction between reforms aimed at restitution (Section 25 (7)) and 
improved security of tenure (Section 25 (5)). 
 
Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution creates a new legal order, in which all South Africans 
are entitled to a common citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state, in 
which there is equality between all people, so that everybody can enjoy and exercise their 
fundamental rights, including human rights. 
 
                                            
1  The most important statutes were the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 and the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 
1991.  See AJ van der Walt ‘Land reform in South Africa since 1990 – An overview’ (1995) 10 SA Public Law 1 
– 30 at 11 – 12; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert (assisted by M van Rooyen) Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (4th ed 2003) 483 – 485 for a brief overview, and see DL Carey Miller (with A 
Pope) Land title in South Africa (2000) 241 – 281 for a fuller discussion. 
2. The so-called Land Acts – the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Development and Trust Land Act 18 of 1936 – 
established ‘grand apartheid’ or spatial race-based segregation by dividing the country into white and non-white 
areas, but apart form these, both ‘grand apartheid and ‘petty apartheid’ were entrenched in a host of other laws 
and legal,sanctioned practices. 
3  AJ van der Walt ‘Towards the development of post-apartheid land law:  An exploratory survey’ (1990) 23 De 
Jure 1 – 45 at 1 – 34; see also AJ van der Walt ‘Property Rights and hierarchies of power: A critical evaluation 
of land-reform policy in South Africa’ (1999) 64 Koers 259 – 294 at 259 - 267. 
4  AJ van der Walt ‘Towards the development of post-apartheid land law:  An exploratory survey’ (1990) 23 De 
Jure 1 – 45 at 1 – 34. 
5 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) Heading 2.3 at http:/land.pwv.gov.za/legislation-policies white-
papers.htm. 
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 It can therefore safely be said that the new Constitution of 1996 is aimed at healing the 
divisions of the past, and building a future characterised by the recognition and restoration 
of human rights, democracy, equality, and freedom for all. 
 
In order to achieve this, the Constitution will have to make its presence felt in both the 
public and private spheres. The challenge addressed here is finding the balance between 
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, and the government’s implementation of land reform 
policies.   
 
 Land reform policies in South Africa are aimed at the restitution of specific land that was 
taken from specific people in the apartheid era.  The Restitution of Land Rights, Act 22 of 
1994, provides for restitution claims and various kinds of restitution orders. 
 
 Land redistribution is a wider category, which is not based upon historical land claims, but 
rather on the general need for land amongst the poor in both rural and urban areas. 
 
 The Housing Act 107 of 1997, the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, the Land 
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, and the Land Reform Pilot Programme of 1995 
are all aimed at the redistribution process. 
 
 Section 28 of the 1993 Constitution was intended to protect existing rights on the one 
hand, while permitting legislative programmes aimed at correcting historical imbalances in 
the distribution of property and wealth on the other. A similar balance is attempted in 
Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution. 6
 
 Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution protects private property from confiscation by the 
state, and requires any expropriation of property to be compensated. It requires 
interference with private property to be authorised by law and to be rational. At the same 
time, the clause requires the state to actively pursue the goals of land redistribution; 
reform of land tenure rights and grants an entitlement to the restitution of property 
dispossessed in pursuance of apartheid policies. 7  
 
                                            
6  Katherine Savage. “An Overview of the key players” in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellman (eds). The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions (2001), 164, 176-81 provides an account of negotiations of Section 25 of the 1996 
Constitution. 
7  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 2002(4) SA 768 
(cc) para 49 (the land reform provisions of Section 25(5)-(9) emphasize that “under the 1996 Constitution the 
protection of property as an individual right is not absolute but subject to societal considerations). 
 3
  The clause, moreover, must be considered in context: the broad context of South African 
history. 8
 
Section 25 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application: 
 For a public purpose or in the public interest, and 
 Subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court. 
 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interest of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances including: 
 The current use of the property; 
 The history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
 The market value of the property; 
 The extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and 
 The purpose of the expropriation.  
 
(4) For the purpose of this section: 
 The public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms 
to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and 
 Property is not limited to land. 
 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources, to foster conditions, which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis. 
 
                                            
8  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005(1) 217 (cc) para 15. 
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 (6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property, or to equitable redress. 
 
(7) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of 
past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this 
section is in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 (1).  Section 36 (1) of the 
Constitution states that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of 
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable. 
 
(8) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in Subsection 6 of the 1996 
Constitution of South Africa 
 
1.2 Purpose of the property clause 
 
 A property clause in a Bill of Rights embodies three broad categories of rights claims, 
namely: 9
 
 Claims to immunity against uncompensated expropriation of private property. This 
protection against uncompensated expropriation means that the state cannot lawfully 
take over property unless it pays for it. 10  Therefore a Constitutional property right 
giving effect to such a claim would be a right not to be excluded from the class of 
property holders. 
 
 A claim of eligibility to hold property. The best example of the recognition of such a 
claim in a human rights instrument is Art 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in the association of 
others”. 
 
 A claim to have property. This claim is premised on the argument that all people have 
a moral right to have at least enough property to enable them to survive or to lead a 
dignified existence. This means that if they do not have property, it should be provided 
                                            
9  Jemery Waldron. The Right to Private Property (1988), 16-24. 
10  The property right “bar(s) Government from forcing some people to bear public burdens which in all fairness and 
justice should be borne by the public as a whole”. 
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 for them, usually by the state. This claim would make the constitutional property right a 
second-generation or socio-economic right. 11 
 
In essence therefore, Section 25 provides that property may not be expropriated by the 
state, except where the expropriation occurs by the law of general application and is for a 
public purpose or in the public interest. Where expropriation meets these criteria, the state 
is obliged to pay monetary compensation to the former holder of the property. There are, 
however, instructions to the state to promote access to land on an equitable basis, 
according to Section 25(5). The Bill of Rights contains a number of socio-economic rights 
to adequate housing (Section 26), together with health care, food, water and social 
security (Section 27). 
 
1.3 Definition of “property” 
 
 Section 25, Bill of Rights, Chapter Two, Act 106, 1996, states that no person may be 
deprived of property, and also that property may not be expropriated without 
compensation. Property is defined in a very wide sense.  Property therefore can be 
defined as both an object of rights and the rights regulating that object.  The meaning of 
Section 25 can therefore have three possible interpretations: 
 
 It can refer to the physical property itself; 
 It could also refer to a set of legal rules governing the relationship between individuals 
and physical property, and 
 It can refer to any relationship or interest with exchange value12. 
 
Property cannot however extend to every right or interest, even if it is a right or interest of 
economic nature.  In interpreting the term, the courts will obviously be guided by the 
existing ambit of the Law of Property, in other words, whether something is recognised as 
property in the existing law. 13  
 
1.4 Deprivation of property 
 
 Having defined the property clause, it is necessary to consider the protection for property 
offered by the Constitution . Deprivation of property by the state is permissible, provided 
                                            
11  Currie, Ian and De Waal, Johan. Fifth Edition. The Bill of Rights Handbook, Juta, 2005, p. 534-535. 
12  Diepsloot Residents & Landowners Association v Administrator, Transvaal, 1993 (3), SA 49 (T). 
13  Thomas Allen “Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right not to be Deproved of Property” (1993), 42 Int & 
Comparative LA, 523, 528. 
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 that it is not arbitrary and is carried out in terms of law of general application. An individual 
therefore has no right to compensation, unless the deprivation of property also amounts to  
expropriation of that property. 14
 
 The bundle of rights that makes up ownership of private property includes:  
 Exclusive rights to the choice of use of a resource; 
 Exclusive rights to the services (fruits) of a resource; and  
 Rights to exchange the resource on mutually agreeable terms. 15 
 
A law of general application must, according to Section 25(1), authorise any interference 
with these rights.  Section 25(1), when literally interpreted, means that there is an added 
protection for property holders against the state’s powers to regulate. This takes the form 
of protection against property deprivations that are not in accordance with due process, as 
understood not only in a procedural sense, but also in a substantive sense. Procedural 
process means that deprivation of property must follow fair procedures, while substantive 
due process means that deprivation of property must not be arbitrary in substance. 
 
1.5 Expropriation from property 
 
 What is expropriation from property? Terms similar to “deprivation” and “expropriation” are 
found in a number of Constitutions of Commonwealth States. For example, Art 13 of the 
Constitution of Malaysia provides that: 
 
(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law; 
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without 
adequate compensation. 
 
 As with Section 25 of the South African Constitution, the Malaysian articles provide that no 
compensation is needed for deprivation of property, but should be provided for a 
“compulsory acquisition” of property. Expropriation therefore must be understood as a 
form of interference with property, with two characteristics. The first is that there must be 
some form of appropriation - taking - of the property. No appropriation takes place if the 
                                            
14  First National Bank para 57. CF Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (SECLD, 2003, 
unreported) para 44 (Section 118 of the Local Government (Municipal Systems) Act 32 of 2000 prohibiting 
transfer of ownership of land unless municipality certifies that all outstanding rates and services charges relating 
to the property have been settled is a “restraint on one of the entitlements of ownership” (i.e. the right of 
alienation) and therefore deprivation). 
15  Iain Currie & Johan de Waal. The Bill of Rights handbook fifth edition, Juta, 2005, p. 542. 
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 state leaves the property in private hands, but imposes restriction on its use. 16The second 
characteristic is that appropriation must be connected with an expropriatory purpose. 17
 
 Compensation 
  
 Section 25 (2) does not remove the power of the state to expropriate property, but 
subjects it to two constraints: 
 An expropriation is permissible only “for public purposes or in the public interest”. 18 
 An expropriation is subject to compensation for the taken property. 19 
 
In this regard, Section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no. 
106 of 1996, stipulates that the term “public interest” must be interpreted to include “the 
nation’s commitment to land reform”, and “reforms” to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources. As far as compensation is concerned, Section 25 (2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no 106 of 1996, states that the 
amount, timing and manner of compensation can be agreed upon between the 
expropriating authority and the expropriate. If no agreement can be reached, 
compensation is determined or approved by a court of jurisdiction. The compensation for 
expropriated property is required to be “just and equitable”. 20 “Just and equitable” 
compensation means market-value payment. 21 To determine market value, the Land 
Claims Court adopted a test known to Commonwealth expropriation juris prudence as 
the Pionte Gourde principle. 22
 
1.6 Restitution and Redistribution of Property 
 
 Section 25 (5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no 106 of 1996, 
stipulates a socio-economic right, requiring the state to implement measures aimed at 
achieving land redistribution. 23  Section 25(7) grants the right to restitution “to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament” of property to persons and communities dispossessed 
                                            
16  Selangor Pilot Association Legislation. 
17  First National Bank paras 80-83 of the Australian High Court jurisprudence dealing with Section 51 (xxxi) of the 
Australian Constitution. 
18  The Expropriation Act 63 of 1965, defines “public purposes” to include “any purpose connected with the 
administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of state”. 
19  Article 14 (3) of the German Constitution provides that “expropriation shall only be permissible in the public 
interest”. 
20  Former Highlands Residents in re Ash v Department of Land Affairs [2000]. 2 All SA 26 (LCC).. 
21  Ibid, para 33. A Eisenbery “Different Formulation of Compensation Clauses (1993) 9 SAJHR 412. 
22  Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-intendment of Crown Lands (Trinidad) [1947], Act 565 
(PC). 
23  In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (cc). 
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 of property as a result of discriminatory legislation after 1913.  Two restrictions on the 
entitlement in the Restitution Act should be noted.  Firstly, claims for restriction must have 
been lodged with the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights by 31 December 1998.  
Secondly, although Section 25 (7) of the Constitution is silent about this, the Act excludes 
claims for restitution if just and equitable compensation “as contemplated” in Section 25 
(3) of the Constitution was paid upon dispossession. Section 25 (6), with Section 25 (9) of 
the Constitution, imposes an obligation on the state to enact legislation relating to land 
redistribution and reform according to Section 25 (8) of the Constitution. The constitutional 
protection of property may not impede the state’s ability to effect land and water law 
reform for the purpose of socio-economic equity.  Failure to compensate expropriation of 
property is a violation of Section 25 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, where property is 
expropriated for purposes of land or water reform, compensation must be paid. 24
 
1.7 Human rights to property 
 
 The inequality and injustice caused by decades of apartheid land law forms the 
background of the land reform programme. The result is temporary and insecure land 
rights, as well as the criminalisation of land use.  An aspect of the apartheid land law 
creating significant problems was the criminalisation of certain forms of land use, 
especially in terms of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951. 
 
 The Group Areas Act of 1966 designated segregated residential areas within the white 
areas for each race group. This implied that only people belonging to a particular race 
group were allowed to own, occupy and use land in a designated area. 
 
 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 was by far the most devastating Act of 
the Apartheid Land Laws. This act forced private landowners and public authorities to 
demolish and remove all buildings and structures erected without landowner’s consent or 
in contravention with building regulations. Most important in this regard was the court’s 
jurisdiction to interpret what is fair and just in each case on its own merits. 25
 
 The effect of the property clause is therefore determined by court interpretation, where the 
court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.  However, to understand the value of property 
rights, they should be interpreted in terms of wealth distribution in a society where there is 
                                            
24  Currie, Ian and De Waal, Johan. The Bill of Rights Handbook, Fifth Edition, Juta, 2005, p. 531-565. 
25  AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar. Law of Property. Fourth Edition, 2004, p.343-352. 
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 a need for proper transformation. 26  Human rights, on the other hand, which are an 
essential element in politics, are upheld by the constitution. Human rights and property 
rights belong to the person, and as such are stipulated in a Bill of Rights within the 
Constitution, which is the “Supreme Law” of the country.  Property rights can be defined 
as legal and social rules, under which economic and social behaviour takes place. 27 A 
problem arises when property rights exercised by one person or group results in the gain 
or loss of these rights to others.  If we evaluate Human Rights against property rights, we 
come to the conclusion that human rights are guidelines of rules and regulations under 
which human interaction takes place. Therefore, human rights to property enjoy a 
prominent position in the Constitution, namely the Bill of Rights, as indicated. It is then 
with this motivation that the applicability of rights concerning property is examined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
26  Murphy, John. Property rights in the new constitution, an analytical framework for constitutional review, vol. 26, 
Issue 2, p. 2-11, July, 1993. ISSN: 0010-4051. 
27  Michael Veseth. The Economics of Property Rights and Human Rights, 2 April 1951. 
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C H A P T E R  T W O  
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN LAND REFORM 
 
 
 
2.1 Objectives of the new land reform policy 
 
 The objectives of the new land reform policy are aimed at dealing effectively with the 
various injustices of racially-based land dispossession. The main objective of this policy is 
to achieve a more equitable distribution of land ownership. Land reform has to contribute 
to the reduction of poverty and economic growth, security of tenure for all and a system of 
land management that would support sustainable land-use patterns and rapid land 
release for development. 28 Thus, the three elements of the land reform programme are 
redistribution to bring equity to the land market, land restitution for the victims of forced 
removals, and land tenure reform. 29
 
 Land reforms, however, have potentially detrimental results for existing landowners. In 
some cases, the reform laws will allow the state to expropriate land. In other cases, land 
will not be expropriated, but the current owner’s use will be subjected to substantial 
restrictions, such as to terminate the occupation rights of tenants or labourers and to evict 
them from the land. However, in view of the country’s history, it is important that unequal 
and inequitable distribution of land be rectified, provided that this complies with the 
requirements of Section 25 and 36 of the South African Constitution. This is necessary to 
determine whether the deprivation or expropriation of property is valid, fair, reasonable 
and justifiable. 30
 
2.2 Role players in policy making 
 
 The Department of Land Affairs arranged a facilitation service to ensure that prospective 
beneficiaries of land reform have access to information and be empowered to apply for 
assistance. 31 Institutions that impacted on the unfolding land policy include the World 
Bank, Urban Foundation and the DBSA. Although the old South African government 
tentatively initiated land reform, little was done to return land to dispossessed 
                                            
28  Department of Land Affairs (DLA) . 1997 c. White Paper on South African Land Policy. 
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white-papers/Ian dwp.html. 
29  Department of Land Affairs (DLA) . 1997c : 15 . White Paper on South African Land Policy. 
30  A.J. van der Walt & G.J. Pienaar. Law of Property. Juta, 2004, pp. 353-370. 
31  Department of Land Affairs (DLA) . 1997c : 58. White Paper on South African Land Policy 
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 communities. The result was therefore that the new 1994 democratic government had to 
take full responsibility for driving the land reform policy.  
 
 The 1994 government immediately introduced new legislative measures such as the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act No 22 of 1994). The Act provided for a land claims 
court and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights. Other legislative measures 
followed shortly. In 1995, the Department of Land Affairs issued the Framework 
Document on Land Policy. 32  This was the starting point for the extensive process of 
public consultations. More than 50 entities, including farming organisations, NGOs, 
Government departments and individuals, responded to the Framework Document. 33 The 
views expressed helped to formulate the Green Paper on South African Land Policy. The 
processes of Green and White Paper documentation often run simultaneously in a single 
department. To redistribute 30 percent of land in South Africa by the target date of 2015 
would require a joint effort from all the levels of government, so that at least 1,7 million 
hectares can be redistributed every year for the period of 2005-15. 34
 
The Constitutional Court, as the highest court in the country, has an important role to play 
in testing government policy against the constitution. As such, this Court makes the final 
decision regarding the constitutional nature of an Act of Parliament, a provincial act or 
conduct of the President. 35  Actions or laws that are constitutional will comply with the 
“spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights”. 36  An illustration of this capacity is the 
October 2000 Constitutional Court ruling that the government, given certain constraints 
and conditions, has the obligation to provide basic shelter to its citizens. 
 
Therefore, when it is in the interest of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court, it 
is important to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court. This is discussed in 
detail in the following Section, “Direct Access”. 
                                            
32  Department of Land Affairs (DLA) . 1995a. White Paper on South African Land Policy 
33  Albert Venter & Chris Landsberg. Government and Politics in the New South Africa, Third Edition, 2006, Van 
Schaik Publishers, p. 186. 
34  Department of Land Affairs, 1996. 
35  The Constitution of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996: 90. 
36  The Constitution of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996: 23-24. 
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2.3 Constitutional Court 
 
Direct Access 
 
Direct access means that the Constitutional Court hears a matter first. The Court provides 
for direct access in certain circumstances. Section 167(6) (a) states that national 
legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in the 
interest of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court to bring a matter directly to the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court is a specialist court and not a court of 
general jurisdiction. It is intended as the court of final instance in relation to constitutional 
matters only defined in Section 167(7) as including “any issue involving the interpretation, 
protection or enforcement of the Constitution.”   
 
The leading case with regard to the interpretation of Section 167  which deals with direct 
access  is Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community. 37 In appeal from the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, the Constitutional Court had to consider a claim for restitution of land brought 
by the Richtersveld Community in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.  The Act, in 
fulfilment of provisions of the interim Constitution and Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution, 
grants a right to the restitution of land.  The right is available on proof of the existence of a 
“right in land” after 1913 and dispossession of that right by a racially discriminatory law or 
practice.  The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) found in favour of the Richtersveld 
Community on these questions. The questions in appeal to the Constitutional Court were 
(1) a contention that the rights of the Richtersveld Community to the land had been 
terminated by the annexation of that land by the British Crown in 1847 and (2) that any 
dispossession of the land after 1913 was not the consequence of racially discriminatory 
laws or practices. Such issues are questions of facts and laws that are not constitutional 
matters. They are, however, susceptible to consideration by the Constitutional Court, 
because they are “issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters”. In summary 
therefore, the Constitutional Court has four principal functions: 
 
 Acting as a court of first instance, it hears matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; 
 In exceptional cases, such as mentioned above, the Constitutional Court may grant 
direct access to hear a matter within its concurrent jurisdiction; 
 To hear appeals from other courts relating to constitutional issues; 
                                            
37  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004(5) SA 460(cc) para 23 (Restitution of Land Rights Act). 
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  To confirm orders made by other courts declaring Parliamentary or provincial legislation 
or conduct of the President constitutionally invalid. 38 
 
2.4 The role of the state 
 
 The role of the state refers to its structure, federal or unitary influences, the way in which 
its functions are implemented and public services rendered, and which level of 
government is responsible for the implementation of such functions. 
 
 South Africa, for example, can be regarded as a unitary state with some federal 
characteristics. This means that power remains concentrated at the level of central 
(national) government, while certain prescribed powers are devolved to provincial and 
local authorities. 39  The courts are not the only institution ensuring the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights. The Constitution creates a similar enforcement mechanism by 
requiring the South African Human Rights Commission to monitor progress in the 
implementation of socio-economic rights and by requiring organs of state to report to the 
Commission. Section 184(3) of the Constitution provides as follows:  “Each year, the 
Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the 
Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the 
realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health, cure, food, water, 
social security, education and the environment”. 40  In Grootboom, the Constitutional 
Court appointed the Commission to monitor the implementation of its order that the state 
devise and implement a housing programme that would cater for people in a situation of 
homelessness.41  The High Court’s order in Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality, 
2000 (3) BCLR 277 (c) indicates the most extensive use of the structural interdict to 
enforce a positive obligation. The court found that the living conditions of the squatters 
were a violation of children’s right to shelter in terms of Section 28 (1) (c) of the 
Constitution of South Africa.  
 
 
In 1994, the democratic government opted for a three-pronged land reform policy to redress the 
historical injustices of land dispossession, denial of access to land and forced removals.  
A detailed discussion of the elements of land reform follows: 
                                            
38  Ian Currie & Johan de Waal. The Bill of Rights Handbook, Fifth Edition, 2005, Juta, p. 110. 
39  Albert Venter & Chris Landsberg. Government and Politics in the New South Africa. Third Edition, 2006, Juta, p. 
89-90. 
40  The Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report, 2002-2003 (2004). <http://www.sahrc.org.za/> 
41  Grootboom, 2001(1) SA 46 (cc), para. 97. 
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(a) Land Restitution 
 
  Purpose: 
 Under the Land Restitution Act of 1994, persons or communities who lost their 
property as a result of apartheid laws or practices after 1913 were invited to submit 
claims for restitution (return of land) or compensation.   
 
 State approach: 
 Restitution policy is guided by the principles of fairness and justice. As such, it must 
be recognised that solutions cannot be forced on people. The restitution process is 
driven by the just demands of claimants who have been dispossessed. They have a 
right to restitution in one form or another. The Department and the Commission will 
encourage claimants and others to come together to resolve claims. Where this 
cannot be achieved, the land claims court will decide the case in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution and the Act. The principles of fairness and justice also 
require a restitution policy that considers the broader development interest of the 
country and ensures that limited state resources are used in a responsible manner. 
To be successful, restitution needs to support, and be supported by, the 
reconstruction and development process. The Constitution and the Restitution of 
Lands Rights Act determine the parameters of the restitution process. 42
 
 (b) Land Redistribution 
 
 Purpose:  
Land redistribution is concerned with making land available for: 
 
 Agricultural production; 
 Settlement, and 
 Non-agricultural enterprises 
 
During the first five years (1994-1999) of democracy, the main emphasis of land 
redistribution was to provide the disadvantaged and the poor with land for housing 
and small-scale farming purposes. 
 
                                            
42  White Paper on South African Land Policy, Land Affairs Department, February, 2006, p.41-42. 
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  State approach: 
 The state approach involved a single, yet flexible redistribution mechanism to 
embrace a very wide range of land reform beneficiaries, including the very poor, 
labour tenants, farm workers, women, individuals and new entrants into agriculture. 
The mechanism can be adapted to continuous conditions. This depends largely upon 
voluntary transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers, which should result 
in dispensed land acquisition and settlement, as against block settlement in 
designated areas. Expropriation is used as a last-resort instrument for use when 
urgent land needs cannot be met, for various reasons, through voluntary market 
transactions. The challenge for government has been to devise and implement a 
programme that responds even-handedly to each segment of the land market in 
order to provide access to the range of clients seeking to obtain land: from the 
poorest, especially female-headed, single-parent families to emergent black 
entrepreneurs. 43   
 
(c) Land Tenure Reform 
 Laws were introduced after 1994 to give people (especially farm workers and labour 
tenants) security of tenure over houses and land where they work and stay. The 
following laws were introduced for this purpose: 
 
 Land Reform Act 3 of 1996:  
  Protecting the rights of labour tenants who live and grow crops or graze livestock 
on farms. They cannot be evicted without a court order, nor if they are over 65 
years old.  
 
 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997: 
This protects the tenure of farm workers and people living in rural areas, including 
their rights to live on the land and the guidelines for other rights such as receiving 
visitors, access to water, health, education and so forth. The Act also spells out 
the rights of owners, protecting them against arbitrary evictions. 
 
 Prevention of Illegal Occupation of Land Act of 1998: 
This act puts in place procedures for the eviction and prohibition of illegal 
occupants. 44
 
                                            
43  White Paper on South African Land Policy, Land Affairs Department, February, 2006, p.29-31. 
44  www.nda.agric.za/docs/redistribution. 
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 2.5 Evaluating the progress made to date by the government and the Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights  
 
 The Bill of Rights in the new Constitution guarantees existing property rights; but it 
simultaneously places the state under a constitutional duty to take reasonable steps to 
enable citizens to gain equitable access to land and to provide redress. 45  The biggest 
constitutional issues involve conflicts of interest between those who benefit from restitution 
claims and those whose existing rights are affected by such claims. The Restitution Act – 
the earliest land reform law promulgated by the new government – was initially authorised 
by Sections 121-123 of the 1993 Constitution and came into operation on 2 December 
1994. 46
 
 The speed with which the Act was promulgated was an indication of the high priority of the 
restitution process for the newly elected ANC government. 47 When the 1996 Constitution 
became operative on 4 February 1997, Section 25 (7) became the new source of 
constitutional authority for the restitution process. This section now authorises the 
restitution of land rights in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, provided 
that persons who have been dispossessed of land qualify in terms of the Act for equitable 
redress. 
 
 Since 1994, the Act has been amended several times to streamline and facilitate the 
process and to bring it in line with the 1996 Constitution. Information was obtained from 
the Land Claims Commission office in Bloemfontein: 
 “The number of cases referred to the Land Claims Court during the period March to 
December 2005 was on average between two and three cases monthly. In January 2006, 
there was a dramatic increase in the number of cases that were referred to the Land 
Claims Court, with the majority of these 25 cases referred to court emanating from 
KwaZulu Natal. The cases were referred to court, in most cases, by the current owners of 
land that was subject to a restitution claim”. 48   
 The following evidence was produced to prove these statements. See Tables 2.1 – 2.4: 
                                            
45  Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) “Constitutional issues”. 
46  Section 121 of the 1993 Constitution set out an entitlement to claim restitution while sections 122-123 
established a Commission on Restitution Rights and vested certain powers in the courts. 
47  Theunis Roux. “Chapter 3: The Restitution of Land Rights Act” in G Budlender, J. Latsky & T Roux. Juta’s new 
Land Law (1998) 2 A-4 footnote 3 explains how the Act was promulgated within 7 months of the new 
government, 1994.  
48   Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2006. 
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Tables 2.1-2.4: Source: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 2006 
Evaluating what has been done to date, and what still has to be done, it can be said that 
 
During an interview with Eddie Nkomazana Communication RLCC FS, of the Department 
 
The first interview was with Anna Bok of Kakamas, and the second with Selma Pharo of 
 
First interview: 
 bly om hier te glo dat hier so baie mense as deel van die Kakamas 
  Claim 
Second interview: 
 dat so baie mense hier is. Vandag praat die Here met my, vandag sê 
 
 
the way forward, if success is to be achieved, should constitute a partnership with 
government, civil society, farmers and all other stakeholders who have an interest in the 
reform policy. Further recommendations are in the form of the government developing a 
comprehensive implementation plan, identifying legislative and policy reforms, and taking 
into consideration constitutional issues like human rights to property and monitoring the 
progress. 
 
of Land Affairs, on the 6th of November 2006, he produced two letters from claimants who 
were interviewed after receiving their land, as proof that land reform and human rights are 
a reality and that positive results have been achieved. 
 
Vaalplaas. 
 
 “Ek is vandag so
gemeenskap is ek eniglik dankbaar aan die kommissie vir die barmhartige manier wat 
hulle tewerk gegaan het om ons eise te finaliseer. Alhoewel die proses lank geneem het, is 
ons gelukkig dat ons eise afgehandel is. Ons regte en menswaardigheid wat deur die 
vorige stelsel ontneem is, is weereens aan ons terugbesorg sodat ons nou met ons lewens 
kan voortgaan. Die grondwet gee ons regte wat ons nooit voorheen gehad het nie, en die 
kommissie gee ons land wat ons voorheen verloor het, en beide het ‘n positiewe 
uitwerking op ons gemeenskap gehad”. 
Anna Bok – beneficiary of Kakamas Land
 
 
 “Ek is vandag so bly
die Here vir ons dat vandag op 24 September 2004 Erfenis Dag vlieg ons met vlerke. Dit 
was baie seer toe ons van die grond geskop was. Dit het gevoel asof ons getreur het. Die 
grond is naby ons harte. Ons is tog so dankbaar vir die Kommissie en die regering dat 
hulle dit moontlik gemaak het vir ons om die grond terug te kry. Ons het so baie slegte 
dinge deurgemaak as gevolg van ongoddelike optrede van mense en die apartheids 
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 regering. Na ‘n tyd het dit gevoel asof ons nooit die grond terug kry nie. Maar vandag is 
ons hier en ons vlieg met vlerke”. 
Ms Selma Pharo, beneficiary of Va alplaas Land Claim 
.6 Conclusion 
Since the current government came to power, much has been achieved in terms of policy 
 
The importance of Land Reform in South Africa arises from the scope of land 
 
It is a fact that land reform is a critical and pivotal factor in our nation’s quest to eradicate 
 
                                           
 
2
 
 
development and land reform implementations.  The Land Reform Pilot Programme was 
launched at the end of 1994, to develop equitable and sustainable mechanisms of land 
redistribution. The Restitution of Land Rights Act, 22 of 1994, was approved by Parliament 
in 1994 and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was established in 1995.  The 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 3 of 1996 provides security of tenure to labour 
tenants; the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 31 of 1996 is a holding 
measure which protects the interests of people who have informal rights to land while an 
investigation is in progress; the Communal Property Association Act, 28 of 1996 provides 
a legal mechanism to accommodate the needs of those who wish to hold land collectively; 
and the Amendments to the Upgrading of Land Tenure Right Act, 112 of 1991, bring this 
Act into line with government’s policy on the conversion of rights to land. In order to 
achieve the re-assignment, delegation and rationalisation of land legislation and 
institutions, the Land Administration Act, 2 of 1995, was adopted. 49
 
dispossession by whites on the basis of racial classification. The land reform programme 
aims to create stability, provide resources for the creation of livelihoods and restore dignity 
between black South Africans, by providing human rights as per the 1996 Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights. 
 
poverty, promote economic growth and sustain development. This is encapsulated in our 
1996 Constitution, which underwrites the three-element approach of restitution to return 
land to those forcibly removed, redistribution for the resettlement of the landless of our 
country, and the call on the state to ensure tenure of security for people who live under 
insecure tenure. 
 
49  White Paper on South African Land Policy Land Affairs Department Land Affairs RSA. 
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  The restitution process in South Africa has come a long way to restore land rights to the 
victims of racial dispossession in a just and equitable manner (see Figures 2.1-2.4, 
Chapter 2 of treatise. The values and principles entrenched in our Constitution are aimed 
at the transformation process of the South African Society, which started when the new 
democratic government came into power in 1994. These values and principles are aimed 
at changing from injustice to justice, from inequality to equality, from oppression to 
democracy, from conflict to reconciliation, from no human dignity to human dignity, from no 
political rights to political rights, etc.  
 
 Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights underscore an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality. This  has all been introduced by the first democratic 
government in 1994; in other words restoring human dignity in the sense of human rights 
for a free and open society, so that democracy can prevail. 
 
 The transition means that old discriminatory laws have been abolished, and that new 
democratic laws are promulgated, such as the 1996 Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
The new Constitution therefore includes ideals to promote human dignity, freedom and 
equality as explicated and protected by the Constitution. The idea is that the Constitution 
embodies and signals a new point of departure in South African history concerning land 
reform. 
 
 By doing this, the Constitution becomes the guiding principle for all legal development, 
land reform and the restoration of human dignity. 
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Constitution seeks to protect the socio-economic rights of citizens. In order to bolster 
access to rights, a positive obligation is imposed on the state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of rights. In the past ten years, since the adoption of the Constitution, the courts 
at various levels have been engaged in a process of balancing of rights. Such a balancing 
was explicitly recognised by the court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers. 
The Court, interpreting the right to property, observed that, while the Constitution 
recognised the right to own, use and occupy property, it also identified and protected the 
land rights of the dispossessed. These rights were not delineated in unqualified terms, but 
presupposed the adoption of measures by the state to open access to land. 
 
The right to property sometimes clashed with the steps taken to eradicate the 
homelessness of the dispossessed. The Court held that the judicial function in those 
circumstances was not to establish a hierarchy of rights, but rather to balance and 
reconcile the competing rights and interests in a just manner. 
 
When considering the three elements of land reform compared with Constitutional issues 
and relevant case law, the balancing and the reconciliation of rights and interests in a just 
manner will be the barometer. 
 
3.2 First element: Land Restitution 
 
 The essence of the restitution process is that individuals and communities who have been 
deprived of land rights as a result of apartheid land laws and practices (and who qualify in 
terms of the requirements set out in the Restitution Act) are entitled to claim restitution of 
their land rights, or other equitable redress. When the 1996 Constitution became operative 
on 4 February 1997, Section 25(7), which is slightly broader than the 1993 provisions, 
became the new source of constitutional authority for the restitution process. The essential 
requirements are that a person or community can institute a restitution claim if that person 
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 or community was dispossessed of a rights in land  after 19 June 1913  as a result of a 
racially discriminatory law or practice and did not receive just and equitable compensation 
or consideration, provided the claim was lodged in time. 50  Both natural and legal persons 
can claim. 51 A direct descendant of a person, who otherwise qualifies, but has not 
claimed restitution, is allowed to claim under certain circumstances. 52
 
 Once a claim has been lodged, the relevant regional commissioner must ensure that it 
meets the qualifying criteria in Section 2 of the Restitution Act, 53 and that the claim has 
been lodged in the prescribed manner and that it is not frivolous or vexatious. 54
 
 Once a regional commissioner has accepted a claim, it must be published in the 
Government Gazette. Such publication has important implications, meaning that nothing 
may be done on that property without notice to the commissioner. 
 
 Case law relevant to the issue of land restitution is Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd, 
as referred to above. Accordingly, the three cases will be discussed, as the matter was 
heard firstly by the Land Claims Court (LCC), secondly by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) and finally by the Constitutional Court (CC). 
 
 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 
 3 SA 1293 (LCC) 
 
  Division : Land Claim Court 
 Date  : March 22, 2001 
  
 Summary of the case 
This is a claim for restitution of rights in the Land Claims Court in terms of Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 Section 2(1) – in other words dispossession as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws and practices. The applicants averred that they were 
communities dispossessed of their land rights in the Richtersveld area due to racially 
discriminatory laws or practices. 
In their claim statement in the Land Claims Court, the plaintiffs assented that the people of 
Richtersveld held title to the subject land and that such title was not at any time prior to 19 
                                            
50  Section 2 of the 1994 Act as amended, compare Section 25(7) of the 1996 Constitution. 
51  DL Carey Miller (with A Pope). Land title in South Africa (2000), 329. 
52  Section 2(1) (c) read with Section 1 of the 1994 Restitution Act. 
53  DL Carey Miller (with A Pope). Land title in South Africa (2000), 340-362, footnote 212. 
54  DL Carey Miller (with A Pope). Land title in South Africa (2000), 341 footnote 212. 
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 June 1913 lawfully extinguished or diminished.  They submit that this title falls within the 
definition of the “Right in Land” as contained in the Restitution of Land Rights Act 6 (6). 
The plaintiffs alleged that they were dispossessed of their land rights by legislative and 
executive state action after 19 June 1913, as a result of racially discriminatory laws and 
practices.  They confirm that they did not receive any compensation with respect to the 
dispossession.  Although the claim is for restitution of land rights, the claim was not 
referred to the Land Claims Court via the Land Claims Commission, but rather by the 
plaintiffs approaching the Land Claims Court directly.  The plaintiffs are however entitled 
to such an action in terms of Chapter IIIA of the Restitution Act.  This is not always 
recommended, as the Court does not have the benefit of investigation or reports by the 
Land Claims Commission.   
 
As a first alternative, the plaintiffs alleged that the people of Richtersveld acquired 
ownership of the subject land, requesting an order declaring such ownership.  As a 
second alternative, they requested an order declaring that the people of Richtersveld hold 
public servitude over the land.   
 
In the first plea, the first defendant alleged that whatever rights the people of Richtersveld 
might have had with respect to the land were extinguished before 19 June 1913.  In the 
second plea, the first defendant pleaded that the Court was not competent for inquiry into 
the issue of aboriginal title.  In the third plea raised by the first defendant, they requested 
that the case be dismissed.  The first and second pleas were later withdrawn. 
 
Court Ruling 
The court held that at the time of the annexation of Namaqualand, all ungranted land was 
owned by the Crown and the doctrine that every title to land should have originated with a 
grant made by the Crown or with their consent. In the present case it has not been proved 
that at the time of dispossession there existed a custom that had become law in terms of 
which the state was obliged to recognise the rights of the plaintiffs over the subject land. 
Court held further that a person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 
1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to restitution of that 
property or to equitable redress. The court held further, that to determine whether a 
particular law or practice had resulted in a dispossession, that law or practice had to be a 
both factual and legal cause of dispossession.55 Accordingly, the court held that there was 
no evidence that the authorities had deliberately failed to recognise any legal rights that 
                                            
55 To determine the legal cause, the Court had to identify the most immediate or direct cause, also known as the 
determinative cause. 
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 the community might have in respect of the land. The only rights that the first plaintiff 
proved lost in respect of the subject land, originated from beneficial occupation of the 
subject land. Therefore the first plaintiff failed to establish two essential elements of the 
restitution claim, namely that dispossession is of a kind that would support a claim for 
restitution and that it resulted from a racially discriminatory law or practice. The first, 
second, third, fourth and fifth plaintiffs claim to be communities. The Court held that, if they 
are not communities or parts of communities, their restitution claim must fail. The claim by 
the sixth plaintiffs was not seriously pursued. No relief for the sixth plaintiff was motivated 
in the plaintiff’s heads of argument. 
 
Evaluation of the Case 
 When evaluating the Richtersveld case in the Land Claims Court, it can be said that the 
Restitution Act Section 2 states clearly that a claim must comply with the requirements of 
the above-mentioned section. What made the above-mentioned case unique, was that the 
Land Claims Court had to decide whether a community could claim restitution for a 
deprivation of land that took place before the cut-off date (19 June 1913). 
 
 The Court however found that the incorporated land became Crown (state) land long 
before 1913, and that it was regarded as state land before and since 1913. During the 
Court proceedings, the community could not prove on a balance of probabilities that they 
were deprived of ownership after 19 June 1913. It also emerged during the proceedings 
that the community did however lose their occupation, but it was not racially motivated, as 
clearly stipulated in Section 2 of the Restitution Act as a requirement. The true reason 
why the community lost their occupation is the result of efforts to secure controlled mining 
of diamonds in the area, and race did not play a role. When considering the finding of the 
Court, it can be seen clearly that the Court made a judgement based on the Restitution 
Act Section 2, by dismissing the applicant’s case for the two reasons stipulated, as 
mentioned above: 
 
(a) The community lost the ownership of the mentioned land before the cut-off date in 
1913; and  
(b) The dispossession was not racially inspired. 
 
The applicants in this case, the Richtersveld Community, lost the case and took it on appeal to 
the Supreme Court. 
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 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 
 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA) 
 
 Division : Supreme Court of Appeal 
 Date  : March 24, 2003 
 
 Summary of the Appeal Case 
The area in dispute is Richterveld in the Namaqualand, which was later incorporated in 
the Cape Colony. The Appellants in this case consisted of communities in this area who 
claimed that they have been dispossessed of their land in Richtersveld as a result of 
racially discriminatory laws and practices. Their claim was for the restitution of their lost 
land rights in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. The land in dispute 
was owned by Alexkor Ltd, which was also the First Respondent. This was a company 
created by statute and the state was the sole shareholder in the company. The area was 
known for its diamonds, and discoveries were made in the mid-1920. In 1994, the Second 
Respondent, the government, granted the land in dispute to the First Respondent, with all 
mineral rights. 
 
First the Land Claims Court (the Court a quo) had to establish if the Applicants had been 
dispossessed of the land and also their rights as a result of racially discriminatory reasons 
or practices. Prima facie the Court found that the Applicants’ case had no merit. The Court 
was of the opinion that not all dispossessions under racially discriminatory laws and 
practices could fall under a restitution claim. In other words, dispossessions that did not 
fall under a law or practice designed to bring about “spatial apartheid”, did not qualify as 
dispossession for the purpose of the Restitution Act. Because of this, the Court had to 
follow its earlier judgements in the case Minister of Land Affairs v Slamdien 1999 (1) 
BCLR 413 (LCC). The Court ordered absolution from the instance (dismissed the case), 
but made a recommendation to the Minister of Land Affairs that alternative, appropriate 
relief be investigated. The Court a quo’s judgement has been reported as the Richtersveld 
community and others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC). 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the appeal (the appeal was 
successful). One of the reasons for the success of the appeal was that the Court held that 
the real ratio of the judgement in the Slamdien case was not the absence of “spatial 
apartheid” measures, but rather the Act that limited restitution remedies to people who had 
been discriminated against in the exercising of their land rights. 
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 The Restitution Act was designed to give effect to Section 9(3)(b), 121, 122 and 123 of the 
interim Constitution of 1993 (now Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution). Section 121(2)(b) 
read with Section 8 (2), provided for restitution to any dispossession of land rights, which 
would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in 
Section 8(2) of the 1993 Constitution. Considering the final Constitution of 1996 Section 
25(7), widened the right to restitution for any dispossession “as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices”.  
 
Court held 
When considering the Richtersveld case, the Land Claims Court’s denial of such rights 
was based upon the fact that there was no racial discrimination. The Land Claims Court 
found that this requirement had not been met. The Court further held that not all 
dispossessions under racially discriminatory laws and practices could support a restitution 
claim. Therefore the Land Claims Court is stating that dispossession that did not occur 
under a law or practice designed to bring about “spatial apartheid” does not qualify as 
dispossession for the purposes of the Restitution Act. 
 
In dismissing the Appellants’ case in the Land Claims Court, the applicant was of the 
opinion that the state failed to recognise and protect their rights. The Land Claims Court 
however stated that the denial of such rights was not demonstrated, or based upon any 
racial discrimination. The Supreme Court found that in so doing, the Land Claims Court 
erred. Their approach ignored the effect of the laws and practices on the Applicants’ 
rights. The Court therefore failed to consider the indirect racial discrimination relied upon 
by the Applicant56. 
 
The Court set aside the order of the Land Claims Court a quo and replaced it with an 
order declaring that, the First Plaintiff was entitled in terms of Section 2(1) of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, to restitution of the right to exclusive beneficial 
occupation and use, akin to that held under common-law ownership, of the subject land, 
including its minerals and precious stones. 
 
The applicants, the Richtersveld Community, won their case in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. This decision was then contested by the respondent, Alexkor, in the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
                                            
56 Taking all these factors into consideration, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided to uphold the Appeal 
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  Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 
 (12) BCLR 1301583 (CC) 
 
 Division : Constitutional Court  
 Date  : October 10, 2003 
 
Summary of the Case 
In earlier proceedings before the Land Claims Court, the First Respondent’s claim was 
dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, it was held that the state’s 
dispossession of the land rights of First Respondent occurred during the 1920s, after 
diamonds were discovered on the land, and that this dispossession was the result of 
racially discriminatory laws or practices. The judgement of the Supreme Court of Appeal is 
reported as Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2003 (6) 
BCLR 583 (SCA). 
 
The first appellant (Alexkor) was granted leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court. A late 
application by the second appellant, (the Government) was granted. 
 
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, it was contended by the Applicant that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has erred in its findings that: 
 
¾ The First Respondent’s rights survived annexation by the British Crown in 1847; 
¾ The First Respondent had a right to the land in 1913; and 
¾ The First Respondent was dispossessed of the land through racially discriminatory 
laws and practices. 
 
The First Respondent argued that these were questions beyond the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction; and alternatively that the Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision was correct. 
 
As to the jurisdiction argument, the Constitutional Court found that the case does raise 
constitutional matters, because of issues related to the interpretation of an Act that 
provides as follows: 
 
“A person or community dispossessed of property after 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to Restitution of that property or equitable redress.” 
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 Therefore the issues in the appeal relating to the interpretation and application of Section 
2(1) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, were all “constitutional matters” over 
which the Constitutional Court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, Section 167(3)(c)  of the 
Constitutional Court was also the final arbiter on “whether an issue is connected with a 
decision on a constitutional matter.” 
 
Court Held 
The Constitutional Court examined the nature of the First Respondent’s title, and 
concluded that the true character of the title that the Richtersveld community possessed in 
the subject land was a right of communal ownership under indigenous law. The content of 
that right included the use of water, grazing and hunting, and exploiting the natural 
resources of the land, both above and beneath the surface. The Constitutional Court 
further held that ownership of the minerals and precious stones also vested under 
indigenous law.  
 
Therefore the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Appeal, that indigenous rights to private 
property in a conquered territory were recognised and protected after the acquisition of 
sovereignty, so that the rights of the Richtersveld community survived annexation, was 
correct. The indigenous law ownership of the Richtersveld community remained intact, as 
on 19 June 1913. 
 
The Constitutional Court found in favour of First Respondent in respect of all three issues 
raised by First Appellant. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal, but made a 
minor amendment to the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal, ordering that: 
 
“The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is amended to read as follows” 
‘…the appeal succeeds with costs including the costs of two counsel. The orders 
of the LCC are set aside and replaced with an order in the following terms: 
It is declared that, subject to the issues that stand over for later determination, the First 
Plaintiff [the Richtersveld Community] is entitled in terms of Section 2(1) of the Restitution 
of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 to restitution of the right to ownership of the subject land 
(including its minerals and precious stones) and to the exclusive beneficial use and 
occupation thereof.” 
 
The Second Appellant was criticised for the delay in seeking special leave to appeal, and 
was ordered to pay the costs of late application on an attorney and client scale. 
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 The Constitutional Court case was thus in favour of the Richtersveld Community 
(Respondents) in a very significant ruling relating to land restitution, human and property 
rights. 
 
Constitutional Issues 
If the outcome of this case study is compared to constitutional issues, it can be said that 
the Bill of Rights in the new Constitution guarantees existing property rights, but it 
simultaneously places the state under a constitutional duty to take reasonable steps to 
enable citizens to gain equitable access to land, especially for those who were 
dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913, as a result of past discriminatory laws or 
practices. The biggest substantive constitutional issue raised by the restitution process 
involves on the one hand those who benefit from restitution and those whose existing 
rights are affected by such claims. 
 
As far as expropriation of private land for purposes of restitution is concerned, it has been 
authorised explicitly in amendments to the 1994 Act; once implemented, these 
expropriations would be undertaken in terms of the provisions of Section 25 of the 
Constitution and the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 57  When the expropriation route is 
followed, it should not cause any problems, provided that the expropriation and transfer 
form part of a legitimate land reform process. Concerning human rights and property, 
Governments shall respect and ensure individual rights without distinction of any kind, by 
passing laws that give effect to these rights, and by providing any person whose rights 
have been violated with an enforceable remedy by law. 58
 
Restitution of State Land is possible if the state certifies restoration as feasible. Section 33 
of the Restitution Act provides specifically for matters to be considered by the Court in 
deciding restitution claims. Examples are the desirability of remedying past violations of 
human rights, the requirements of equality and justice, or any other factor that the court 
considers relevant and consistent with the spirit and objectives of the Constitution. 
 
Compensation can include both compensation for the value of the land and for additional 
direct financial loss caused by the original dispossession, as well as an amount for 
hardship, such as emotional suffering. 
 
                                            
57  The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 48 of 2003 inserted Section 42 E into main Act of 1994 to 
authorise the minister to purchase, acquire or expropriate land and Rights in land for restitution purposes. 
58  English & Stapleton, The Human Rights Handbook. Juta, 1997, p.18. 
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 3.3 Second element: Land Redistribution 
 
  The redistribution of land consists of various laws and programmes aimed at making land 
available to people with insufficient or no land. The purpose is to establish a more 
equitable distribution of land. This aspect of land reform finds its authority in Section 25(5) 
of the 1996 Constitution, which provides that the state must take reasonable measures 
within its available resources to foster conditions that enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis. 
 
  Section 25(5) of the Constitution delineates a socio-economic right, requiring the state to 
implement measures aimed at achieving land redistribution. 59  Section 25(6) read with 
Section 25(9) of the Constitution, imposes an obligation on the state to enact legislation 
relating to land redistribution and reform. The Development Facilitation Act of 1995 was 
introduced to provide for additional land reform matters not arising from specific historical 
land claims, in other words to promote redistribution of land through the greater availability 
of land. 
 
  The act must be regarded as an attempt to control and promote a variety of land-reform 
initiatives of a redistributive nature. This involves making enough and suitable land 
available for development purposes, and providing suitable mechanisms by which the land 
can be used to give access to land quickly and cost effectively. The central aim of the 
Land Reform Pilot Programme of 1995 is to develop efficient, equitable and sustainable 
mechanisms of land redistribution in rural areas. 
 
 The following case heard in the Land Claims Court makes an interesting finding on the 
redistribution of land in the process of land reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
59  In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001(1) SA 46 (cc) para 42. 
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 Mahlangu NO v Minister of Land Affairs and others 2001 2 ALL SA 190 (LCC) 
  
 Division: Land Claims Court 
 Date: 2001 
 Summary of the Case  
The Claimant lodged a claim to the Land Claims Court for the restitution of a certain 
property in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights, Act 22 of 1994.  The Third Respondent 
found that the claimant’s claim did not meet the requirements of Section 2 of the 
Restitution Act to claim, due to the fact that the claimant could not prove that they had 
been dispossessed of their property.  The recommendation of the Third Respondent was 
therefore that the matter be dealt with under Section 6 (2)(b) of the Restitution Act, as a 
redistribution claim.   
 
Upon which the First Respondent attempted to sell some of the land, whereupon the 
claimant launched proceedings in the High Court to interdict the sale.  However, the 
matter was settled out of court on the basis that the First Respondent would not alienate 
the land without 30 days’ notice to the applicant.  In 1999, the First Respondent, acting in 
terms of the settlement, indicated via a letter to the claimant’s attorneys her willingness to 
sell a portion of the property. 
 
Court Held 
- In order to establish whether the applicant disclosed a prima facie case to be 
granted relief, the Court enquired whether the Applicant had a “serious question 
to be tried”.  This was weighed against the balance of convenience. 
 
- The Court is required to weigh the apparent strength of the Applicant’s case in 
terms of the final relief, on the one hand, and against the balance of 
convenience on the other (balancing of rights to achieve equilibrium). 
 
The issues emerging for determination were: 
 
- Whether the Applicant’s failure to apply for the review of the land to the 
Regional Land Claims Commission is a barrier to an application for direct 
access in terms of Section 399 of the Restitution Act; 
 
- Whether the matter is res judicata; 
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 - Whether the Applicant’s acceptance of referral of the matter in terms of Section 
6(2)(b) to be dealt with as a redistribution matter amounts to a  waiver of rights 
to restitution in terms of the Act; 
 
- Whether the Court had jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s aboriginal claim 
dating earlier than 19 June 1913. (A jurisdiction argument is always an 
interesting point, but can end a case quickly if it is found that the Court has no 
jurisdiction and the case is dismissed as a result). 
 
- Whether the claimant suffered a dispossession as defined in the Restitution Act; 
 
- Whether the balance of convenience favours granting relief. 
 
- Concerning the first issue, the Claimants were satisfied with the decision of the 
Court, stating that under a redistribution programme, no one has a claim to a 
specific plot of land. 
 
- With regard to the second matter, the counsel for the First and Second 
Respondents argued that the matter was res judicata. 
 
- With regard to the third issue, the Court found that, although the claimants 
referred the claim for redistribution, this does waive the right of the Applicants to 
claim restitution under the Act. 
 
- Concerning the fourth issue, which is the cut-off time on 19 June, 1913; the 
Court has no jurisdiction to hear cases pertaining to a prior date. 
 
- With regard to the fifth issue, the Court found that the Applicant did not specify 
clearly the date of dispossession or the reasons for the loss of property.  This 
means that there is no serious question to be tried. 
 
- The Court concluded that the Applicant did not demonstrate a serious question 
to be tried, and therefore the balance of convenience favoured the 
Respondents. 
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 Case Evaluation 
 
 When evaluating the case of Mahlangu No v Minister of Land Affairs, it can be said that de 
Novo, the Applicants, did not have a prima facie case. Once again a claim was lodged for 
restitution of property but the Applicants’ claim did not meet the requirements of Section 2 
of the Restitution Act, because the Applicants could not show that they had been 
dispossessed of the property.  The question that now arises is whether this application 
was frivolous and vexatious.  Should the judge have dismissed the case due to the fact 
that the applicants had no locus standi? The Third Respondent recommended that the 
Court must consider the application under Section 6(2) of the Restitution Act and deal with 
the matter as a redistribution claim. The Respondents in this case however acted 
irresponsibly by attempting to sell a portion of the property whilst proceedings were 
underway. The reason for this is that, when a regional commissioner has accepted a 
claim, it must be published in the Government Gazette. This publication has important 
implications, namely; no person may improperly obstruct the passage of the claim, and no 
person may sell, exchange, donate, lease, subdivide, rezone or develop the land without 
giving the commissioner prescribed notice. When consider the case in casu, the 
Applicants had to apply for an interdict to prevent the Respondent from alienating any of 
the property pending finalisation of the claim. In other words, it can be said with 
confidence that the Respondent did not comply with the applicable regulations. One 
wonders, in cases like these, what type of legal aid the Respondent’s attorneys actually 
rendered their clients. 
 
 When considering the merits of the applicant’s case, one feels that this case should not 
even have been entered into the Court. It is an example of a case with no merit and a total 
waste of the taxpayer’s money. The Court’s finding that the Applicants did not have a 
serious question to be tried shows that this case should have been dismissed de novo, 
with costs. 
 
 The application was dismissed. 60
 
 Constitutional Issues 
 Most of the actual work on provisions of access to land in terms of Section 25(5) takes 
place in the form of government policy making. Many black people were prevented from 
acquiring access to urban land by apartheid laws. They found themselves restricted or 
                                            
60  Mahlangu No v Minister of Land Affairs and Others 2001 2 ALL SA 190 (LCC). 
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 removed from urban areas in terms of pass laws, or by racially discriminatory legislation. A 
consequence of this uneven pattern of urban land distribution caused the poor to locate in 
inaccessible and remote areas, and poverty-stricken and crime-ridden circumstances. It is 
important that the redistribution programme be designed in a manner that will allow it to 
respond to different needs and circumstances in appropriate ways so that it contributes to 
the alleviation of poverty and economic growth, with the restoration of human rights. 
 
 In cases such as the above, it can be concluded that it is preferable for such land claims 
to be dealt with through a comprehensive programme of redistribution, rather than as 
individual claims for restitution. One possible way of addressing such claims is through 
access to commonage.  A reallocation of commonage to poor residents, who wish to 
supplement their income, could address local economic development and provide an 
inexpensive land reform option. The term commonage is traditionally given to land owned 
by a municipality or local authority, usually acquired through state grants or from the 
Church. It differs from other municipality-owned land in that residents have acquired 
grazing rights on the land, or the land was granted expressly to benefit needy local 
inhabitants. 
 
 According to a spokesman at the Department of Land Affairs, the Department is 
committed to ensure that existing commonage land is used as far as possible for land 
reform purposes, and the Department will support the purchase of additional land for 
commonage purposes where necessary. 
  
3.4 Third element:  Security of Tenure (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
 
 The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 31 of 1996 is intended to strengthen labour 
tenants’ land rights and to increase access to agricultural land. 61 In order to qualify for 
any of the protective measures in the act, a prospective Applicant therefore first has to 
prove that he or she is a labour tenant as defined in the Act. 
 
 Section 1 of the Act defines a labour tenant as someone residing or with the right to reside 
on a farm with the right to use cropping or grazing land in exchange for labour. The 
protection envisaged by the Act works in two directions. On the one hand it provides 
tenure security for labour tenants by confirming their right to occupy the land in question 
                                            
61  In this regard the Act has both restitution and tenure reform facets. see D.J. Carey Miller (with A Pope) Land title 
in South Africa (2000) 525. 
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 and or the other it ensures that they cannot be evicted from the land. In terms of the act, 
the owner or lesser may only evict labour tenants if it is fair and equitable to do so. 62
 
 The act precludes evictions against labour tenants who are older than 60 or cannot 
provide labour personally. 63 Labour tenants who satisfy all the requirements in Section 1 
of the Tenure Act may apply for an award of land or land rights and for financial 
assistance. 64
 
 The case of Zulu below illustrates the relevant issues relating to security of tenure and the 
land reform process in South Africa. 
  
 Zulu and Other v Van Rensburg and Others (1996) 2 ALL SA 615 (LCC) 
 Division: Land Claims Court 
 Date:  May 17, 1996 
 Summary of the Case  
The owner of certain farms had, upon his death, granted right of use over his property to 
his wife.  This was held in trust by Volkskas Limited, on behalf of two beneficiaries.  
Subsequently, the farms were taken over by Mr. X, who conducted farming practices on 
behalf of the deceased farmer’s wife.  Mr. X and the widow fell in love and were married.  
Prior to the original owner’s death, the Second and Third Applicants, as well as the 
husband of the Sixth Applicant, resided on the farms, with certain grazing rights, in return 
for which they provided labour.  When Mr. X assumed control of the property, the Second 
and Third Applicants, and the husband of the Sixth, entered into an agreement in terms 
of which they would have the right to continue residing with their families on the farms 
and to graze their stock on the property.  In return they would provide labour to Mr X.  
Similar agreements were reached with the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Applicants, using 
the original agreement with the original farmer as a guideline. 
 
At this stage, all applicants regarded Mr X as the new owner of the farms.  In 1992, the 
estate of Mr. X’s new wife was sequestered.  In 1995, Mr. X entered into a written 
agreement in terms of which he purported to buy the right of use of the farms from the 
trustee of his wife’s insolvent estate.  Two months later,, Mr. X entered into another 
agreement, whereby he purported to sell the right of use to a partnership, including the 
First and Second Respondents. 
                                            
62  Silberg and Schoemans. The Law of Property (4th ed 2003) 493. 
63  Section 9 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
64  Silberg and Schoeman’s. The Law of Property (4th ed 2003) 496. 
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The Respondents took control of the farms and adopted the attitude that the second 
agreement terminated the agreement between Mr. X and the Applicants.  The Applicants 
were informed that they would have to enter into written contracts with the Respondents, 
in terms of which they would be entitled to continue residing on the farms in return for 
supplying labour.  The Applicants would also be required to dramatically reduce the 
number of their cattle. 
 
At the beginning of 1995, a meeting was held with the Applicants, during which the First 
Respondent threatened to evict them if they did not enter into the proposed written 
agreement.  However, no final written agreement was reached.  By March 20, 1996, the 
Respondents and Mr X delivered a written notice to each Applicant, stating that they 
would be evicted if they failed to vacate the farms and remove their stock.  One of the 
paragraphs in the eviction notice gave the Applicants until 20 June 1996 to vacate the 
farms and remove their stock, while another paragraph gave them seven days to remove 
all their stock. 
 
Upon receiving the notice, the Third Applicant concluded a written agreement with the 
Respondents.  The other Applicants did not enter into any agreements, nor did they 
remove their stock within the seven-day period.  On 18 March 1996, their stock was 
impounded in terms of the Natal Ordinance 32 of 1947. 
 
The Applicants brought an urgent application to the Land Claims Court, claiming to be 
labour tenants, as contemplated in the Act.  They contended that they were in peaceful 
and undisturbed possession of their stock and sought a mandament van spolie.  The 
Respondents argued that the Applicants were not labour tenants, that the impounding 
occurred in terms of the painds ordinance, which preclude granting a mandament van 
spolie and that, in any event, the Applicants had not made a case for such relief.  The 
Third Applicant alleged that he had signed the agreement under duress and that it 
deprived him of his rights as a labour tenant.  The Respondents submitted that the 
agreement had been entered into willingly and that the Third Applicant was never a 
labour tenant.  The Respondents also raised two points in Limine: 
1. That the urgency of the matter was of the Applicants’ own making and that the 
application for condonation of non-compliance with the forms, service and time 
limits prescribed by the Rules of the Supreme Court should therefore be 
refused; and 
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 2. that the Land Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant a mandament van 
spolie. 
 
Court Held: 
- On the facts before it, the Court held that the Applicants had not delayed 
unduly in bringing this matter to court, and that the circumstances justified an 
urgent ruling. 
 
- With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the Court accepted the contention that it 
was a creature of statute, and that the Court had to exercise its powers within 
the four corners of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.  The English 
text of Section 33(2) of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (“the 
Act”), requires the Court to determine “any justiciable dispute” arising under the 
provisions of the Act.  The Court found that, where there was a complaint 
regarding the infringement of the right of labour tenants not to be evicted (as in 
this matter), a justiciable dispute was arising from the provisions of the Act. 
 
- Apart from the jurisdiction conferred by Section 33(2) of the Act, Section 5 
implied that it was the Court’s function to determine disputes concerning the 
alleged unlawful eviction of labour tenants. 
 
- The Court then considered whether the Applicants could be accurately defined 
as “labour tenants” as stipulated in Section I(xi) of the Act.  The court held that 
all requirements as set out in the definition Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), had to 
be complied with in order to qualify as a labour tenant.  It was common cause 
that the Applicants complied with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
the definition.  The outstanding disputes therefore was whether the parent or 
grandparent of each Applicant resided on the farm in question, whether they 
had cropping or grazing rights, and whether the Applicants were farm workers 
and thereby excluded from the definition of labour tenant. 
 
- The Court held that the Second Applicant met the requirements of Paragraph 
(c).  This means that an Applicant is not required to show the compliance of his 
parents or grandparents with the definition of “labour tenant”.  Residing on the 
farm while enjoying cropping and grazing rights is sufficient to comply with this 
definition (in a restitution claim, this would have been important). 
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 - The Third and Sixth Applicants alleged that their fathers and grandfathers 
resided on the farms and provided labour to the original owner. 
 
- The First, Fourth and Fifth Applicants alleged that their parents or 
grandparents satisfied the requirements of Paragraph (c). 
 
- The Court accordingly concluded that the Applicants were not farm workers (in 
other words, no employer/employee relationship) and that, for the purpose of 
considering interim relief, they fulfilled the requirements of the definition of a 
“labour tenant”. 
 
- The Court found that the Applicants clearly enjoyed the right to use the farms 
for grazing until the time of the wife’s insolvency. 
 
- The Court held that, in the event that the Applicants did not have any rights by 
virtue of the agreements, a proper interpretation of the Act created a form of 
statutory labour tenancy, which includes the right to use the farms for grazing. 
 
- The Court found that the Applicants would be severely prejudiced if they were 
not granted interim relief. 
 
- On the facts, the Court held that the Applicants made a case for interim relief 
and ordered the return of the stock and the restoration of land use for grazing. 
 
 Evaluation of the Case 
 When evaluating this case under land tenure, it can be said that the Court once again 
considered the Labour Tenants law, namely Act 3 of 1996 Section 1, where it stipulates 
clearly that a person has to satisfy all three requirements to qualify as a labour tenant and 
that they are distinguished from a labour tenant by the fact that a farm labourer is paid 
predominantly in cash. A labour tenant’s main remuneration consists of the right to use the 
land for grazing, cropping, etc. 
 
 When considering the finding of this case, it can safely be said that the applicant had 
Locus Standi, and that a ruling concerning the matter was needed. Once again the 
applicant was measured according to the requirements of the Tenure Act, as to whether 
he qualifies as a labour tenant.  On the merits of the case, as already mentioned, the 
Court found that the Applicants would be severely prejudiced if they were not granted 
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 interim relief.  The Court was also satisfied that the Applicants made a case for interim 
relief. Once again, this is an interesting example of the balancing of rights between an 
owner of property and a tenant who has historically been discriminated against. 
 
 A further well-known example of the Security of Tenure is the Modderklip case. It also fits 
perfectly with the theme of the treatise, which is the balancing of rights between the public 
and the individual. In this case, a large group of people illegally occupied a portion of a 
farm. By the time the landowner utilised his rights and obtained an eviction order, the 
illegal occupiers had grown in number to 36 000, and the sheriff insisted on a deposit of 
R1.8 million to execute the eviction. Logically the state refused to contribute to the costs of 
the eviction. The High Court however granted a structural interdict, ordering the 
government to produce a plan to end the unlawful occupation and to find alternative 
accommodation for the squatters.65
 
 The Supreme Court of Appeal came up with an appropriate order, declaring that the 
fundamental rights of both the landowner (individual) and the squatters (public) had been 
impaired (balancing of rights to reach equilibrium) and that the squatters were allowed to 
remain on the land until alternative accommodation was made available by the local 
government. 
 
 Moreover, that the landowner (individual) was entitled to constitutional damages 
(calculated in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975) for the loss of land use during the 
period of occupation, and that the state had failed to provide alternative land for the illegal 
occupiers.66
 
 It can therefore be said that the balancing of rights and reaching equilibrium are necessary 
when evaluating land reform policies in relation to human rights. 
 
 Constitutional issues and tenure: 
 In South African law, various rights to property are recognised, of which ownership (as 
real right) is one. Ownership is therefore a legal relationship between an owner and a 
thing or things, which implies that the owner can exercise certain entitlements in respect of 
the thing or things. Economic, social and political considerations also resulted in the 
concept of ownership being radically amended and developed in the interest of the whole 
community. Examples of this are the abrogation of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and 
                                            
65. Modderklip Boerdery (EDMS) BPK v President of the RSA 2003(6) BCLR 638 (T). 
66 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) 
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 the promulgation of, amongst others, the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, the 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 
of 1997 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998 which in theory make ownership of immovables accessible to all population groups.  
The purpose of tenure reform is to increase the value and security of existing land tenure 
rights. Most laws in this category serve this purpose by providing strict rules, requirements 
and procedures that must be met before an occupier’s or user’s rights may be terminated 
and before the occupier or user may be evicted. This aspect of land reform is authorised 
by Section 25(6) of the 1996 Constitution, which provides that a person or community 
whose tenure of land is insecure because of past racially discriminatory laws or practice is 
entitled to secure tenure or other redress as provided for in a Law of parliament. The act 
provides for mediation in cases of conflicting claims as well as for alternative land and for 
compensation to the landowner.  For purposes of tenure, the most important function of 
the act is to provide requirements to protect labour tenants against unfair or unlawful 
evictions.  The South African tenure reform laws have so far survived several 
constitutional challenges, although the most serious constitutional issue with regard to 
their application is perhaps not their constitutional validity as much as the extent to which 
the constitutional and statutory reform measures are allowed to amend, change or 
develop the common law. 67
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
 To ensure that the 1996 Constitution conformed to the principles of justice, the 
Constitutional Court was required to certify the draft. The 34 Constitutional Principles were 
then accepted as the framework for the creation of a democratic state with a Supreme 
Constitution, in which the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens are protected. 
Apart from observing the rule of law, the Constitution also requires the government to 
respect the principles of democracy and human rights. At least since the French and 
American Revolutions, it has been accepted that no person or institution has a divine right 
to govern others. In terms of the Bill of Rights, it can be said that the Bill of Rights instructs 
the state to use the power that the Constitution gives it in ways that do not violate 
fundamental rights and to promote and fulfil those rights. 
 
 The 1996 Constitution also made significant changes to the power of the courts to enforce 
the Constitution. Under the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court held in the 
                                            
67  AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar. Introduction to the Law of Property, Fourth Edition. Juta, 2004. 
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 Pharmaceutical Manufactures case, that there is only one system of law. It is shaped by 
the Constitution, which is the supreme law. All law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.68
 
 The duty of the courts is therefore to ensure that ordinary law conforms to the Bill of 
Rights in the rights and duties that it confers. The Constitution places a range of duties on 
all role players in this process of transformation in the new South Africa. These duties rest 
on legislature to formulate reform laws, on the judiciary to interpret and apply these laws 
clearly, and on the individual to respect these laws, so that the Constitution can come 
alive in everyone’s life and fulfill its role in making the country more democratic, free and 
fair, with the necessary human rights so that human dignity can prevail. 
 
 Through an examination of case law in relation to the three elements of land reform policy 
in South Africa, this chapter has illustrated how the balancing of rights has been 
interpreted by the applicable courts. The way in which the implementation of land reform 
policies is mediated by the legal system through the application of human rights standards 
is elucidated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
68 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In RE: Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 
(2) SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
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C H A P T E R  F O U R  
TOWARDS THE FUTURE … 
 
 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
 
 One of the most problematic aspects of the property clause (Section 25 of the 
Constitution, 1996) is the relationship between land-reform initiatives and the protection 
of existing human rights, as indicated in the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
of 1996. 
 
 When considering the three elements of land reform in relation to human rights, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, it is clear that the state has to date of necessity adopted a juristic 
stance in testing land reform policies. However, it is worrying that the state has a 
responsibility and a wide legislative power to introduce and enforce regulatory controls 
over property in the public interest, even if the imposed regulations affect existing human 
rights. 
 
 It is accepted world wide that land reform is a legitimate part of the state’s duties to be 
undertaken in the public interest, and also that the protection of property has to be 
regarded as part of a process of establishing an equitable constitutional balance between 
the interest of individuals and the public.  In this balancing process, the individual 
property holder’s rights should be measured against the rights of the public over the use 
of property and the distribution and exploitation of property. 
 
 Therefore rights can only be protected in so far and in such a way as is indicated by this 
balance, and by the values of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
the promotion of equality and freedom. 
 
 The protection of property as a fundamental right should neither threaten nor limit rights 
unreasonably or unfairly.  Consequently, it should not impede, but rather promote and 
encourage land reform.  It is of importance that the property clause in the Constitution, 
Section 25 of 1996, not be confused or compared with traditional, private-law protection 
of property.  In private law, the purpose of property protection is to absolutely insulate the 
rights in question from any invasion or interference that is not based on the owner’s 
permission. 
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 In Constitutional Law, the purpose of the property clause is to ensure that a just and 
equitable balance is achieved between the interests of private property holders and the 
public in the control and regulation of property use.  The case law used to illustrate the 
three elements of land reform as it has developed over the past ten years since the 
adoption of the new constitution, has established a position regarding property and its 
protection in the constitutional context.  The issue must be seen in view of the special 
and unique function and purpose of the Bill of Rights.  This however, does not mean that 
existing property holdings are guaranteed absolutely against any interference or invasion 
not authorised or consented to by the owner.  In other words, no constitutional property 
clause can guarantee existing property holdings indefinitely and absolutely.  And no 
property guarantee can survive the existence and absolute insulation of unjust and 
inequitable distribution.  But the principle remains that the notion of a constitutional 
democracy requires some justice and equity in the distribution of land.  It seems 
reasonable to argue that an important part of the function of the new Constitution was to 
free land and property from the constraints of apartheid laws and to promote the 
distribution of property and security of land tenure 
 
 It can be said that the courts have a definite constitutional function in controlling the 
constitutional validity and justification of legislative limitations on property rights. 
 
 The juris prudence of the European Court of Human Rights is instructive in this regard:  
the court accepts that it needs to leave a wide “margin of appreciation” for individual 
member states to decide on the wisdom and suitability of regulatory controls over 
property. South African courts can find extremely valuable examples, suggestions and 
support in foreign law.   
 
 The constitutional approach to the property clause suggests that a wider rather than 
narrower concept of property is appropriate for constitutional questions; for example that 
the compensation issue can be seen as part of the balancing process rather than just 
private law reparation.  This makes it possible to see the protection of existing property 
rights and the promotion of land reform as related and equally important. 
 
In this constitutional process, the idea is not so much to solve the inherent tension 
between individual property interests and the public interest in property, but rather to 
maintain an equitable balance. 
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 In the spirit of the new democracy, a land reform programme cannot exist without taking 
human rights into consideration.  One of the major characteristics of apartheid Land Law 
was that the rights and interests of black people to use land were systematically eroded 
and disregarded.  In the wake of the new Constitution, it now becomes possible that the 
effect of the 1996 Constitution was to overturn that position and create a situation where 
rights could be recognised, not only by way of land reform legislation, but also by taking 
human rights, democracy and freedom into consideration. 
 
The major issue is still whether white South Africans are ready for the transformation of 
property, even with compensation as indicated in the Bill of Rights. Is land compensation 
the answer to the political settlement concerning the transformation of property? Are 
sufficient funds available for a meaningful redistribution programme? This could be the 
answer to this delicate and sensitive issue. 69   
 
 Article 1 of Protocol 1 on Human Rights states: 
 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
condition provided for by law by the general principles of international law”. 
 
 Property rights are a part of a general right to a standard of living, life and dignity. It is 
based upon human rights as an integrated whole, which is linked to social and economic 
rights. 70   Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implies that 
land reform must be carried out without any discrimination based on race, class, sex or 
ethnicity: all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth, or other status.  The principle of non-discrimination is also 
embedded in the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the Woman’s 
Convention and Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa.  The new South Africa is concerned with human rights abuses, 
tackling issues of land reform, and the redistribution of wealth. 
 
                                            
69  Robertson, Michael. Land and Human Rights in South Africa: A reply to Marcus and Skweyiya (1990) SAJHR, 
215.  
70  Hellum, Anne and Derman, Bill. Land reform and Human Rights in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Balancing 
individual and Social Justice through an Integrated Human Rights Framework, do1:1016 lj.worlddev.2004. 
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  The Bill of Rights instructs the state to use the power that the Constitution gives it in ways 
that do not violate fundamental rights and which promote and fulfil these rights. Should 
the state fail to comply with these instructions, it will act unconstitutionally.  One of the 
most important expressions in the South African Law is “maxim ubi ius ubi remedium”, 
- where there is a right there is a remedy. 71  Equality, according to Section 9 (2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no 106 of 1996, includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms for all citizens. Special measures may be taken to 
ensure the protection or advancement of people disadvantaged by discrimination in the 
past.  Section 37 of the Bill of Rights explains under which conditions a state of 
emergency may be declared. (Most international human rights instruments contain 
provisions similar to Section 37 of the Bill of Rights in South Africa). 72  Human rights are 
now protected in the new South Africa by a supreme and justifiable Constitution. The 
suspension of rights will only be possible under the conditions prescribed by Section 37 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no106 of 1996. 
 
 It is clear that the 1996 Constitution contains the aspects and characteristics to play a 
definite role in the process of transformation in South Africa. This means that the property 
clause, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, has to be interpreted and applied on the values of 
the constitution in a functional way, making sure that constitutional rather than private law 
be emphasized. 
 
 In Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, this treatise shows that property for the purpose of Section 
25 of the Constitution is a constitutional right. Its character as indicated in the 1996 
Constitution implies that property questions cannot be addressed in terms of traditional or 
private law principles. This mean in practice that all property issues have to be regarded 
against the background of their constitutional relation: This will establish and maintain a 
just and equitable constitutional balance between the protection of private property and 
the promotion of public interest in land reform. 
 
 The protection of individual rights cannot be undertaken without due regard for public 
interest, just as regulatory controls over property in the public interest must have regard 
for the protection of the existing property interests of individuals. It can therefore be said 
that the Constitution both protects existing rights and authorises the promotion of land 
reform within the framework of Section 25 of the Constitution, and that every aspect of the 
                                            
71  Currie, Ian & De Waal, Johan. The Bill of Rights, Fifth Edition, Juta 2005, p.23. 
72  Article 15. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art 27, 
Americal Convention on Human Rights, Art 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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 property clause has to be regarded as part of a constitutional effort in balancing individual 
interests and public interests in terms of a constitutional order. 
  
There will be growing pains, but pearls cannot be born without pain.  Indeed, according 
to William Caldwell “every great work of art goes through messy phases”. 
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